


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
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THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY

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ILOILO

AN EPISODE OF JANUARY, 1899,

AND

STRAINED RELATIONS IN MANILA.

FIRST SERIES.

VI.

February 25, 1901.

This pamphlet may be obtained
by application to L. K. Fuller,
12 Otis Place, Boston, Mass.

Price, 10 cents.

PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY

OF THE

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Society



THE Philippine Information Society is preparing a series of publications in pursuance of the purpose for which the Society was formed, that, namely of placing within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them.

The whole of the evidence, even the whole of the official evidence, is more voluminous than a busy people can be expected to read. Some selection on our part has, therefore, been a necessary condition of the accomplishing of our object. This selection by us has, however, been confined, so far as possible, to the choosing of subjects to be dealt with. Upon each subject chosen we have given in some cases all the evidence obtainable, in all other cases as much of the important and authoritative evidence as is possible within reasonable limits, with ample references to the remainder. In these cases we have endeavored to include the evidence that is most authoritative and important.

If those of whatever shade of opinion who find our mediation unsatisfactory, or who are not convinced of our success in getting the whole story, will appeal from us to the original sources of information, our object of promoting a knowledge of the facts will be only the more effectively secured. We shall be grateful for any criticism or information convicting us of the omission of any important evidence, or of any appearance of unfairness in the presentation of evidence, and will endeavor to profit thereby in future editions.

The subject of the present series of papers has seemed to us as important as any that could be selected. It comprises the principal episodes in the history of our relation to the Filipinos, chiefly as that history is contained in our State papers. We have been careful to include the evidence which tells of the Filipinos' share in that history as well as our own. Whatever view one may hold as to the proper policy for us to pursue toward the Filipinos, it is evident that no policy can be intelligently chosen nor successfully carried out unless it is based upon an understanding of these people, and of their present attitude toward us, and toward the question of our relation to them. It is hoped that the account we shall offer may prove a help toward an understanding of the present situation.

THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY.

OUTLINE OF FIRST SERIES.

THE STORY OF THE FILIPINOS

AS TOLD IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC PUBLICATIONS.

I. José Rizal, the Filipino Patriot: together with an account of the Insurgent Movement of 1896.

II. Aguinaldo: a Selection from his Official Documents, together with the Authorized Accounts of the alleged "Spanish Bribe."

III. The Insurgent Government of 1898.

IV. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898.

V. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899.

VI. Iloilo: An Episode of January, 1899, and Strained Relations in Manila.

VII. Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899.

VIII. Efforts to secure an Armistice, April and May, 1899.

IX. Efforts at Recognition, October and November, 1899.

X. Present Condition and Attitude.

NOTE. It will be impossible to bring out the circulars in their chronological order owing to the difficulty and delay in securing certain of the necessary official documents, some of which, indeed, are not yet in our hands. Every effort will be made, however, consistent with thoroughness and accuracy to issue them as soon as possible.

TABLE OF DATES.

Battleship Maine destroyed	Feb. 15, 1898.
Meeting between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo	April 24, 1898.
Dewey cables for Aguinaldo to join him	April 24, 1898.
War with Spain declared	April 26, 1898.
Battle of Manila Bay	May 1, 1898.
Aguinaldo brought down by U. S. S. McCulloch	May 19, 1898.
Military Government of Filipinos organized	June 18, 1898.
Revolutionary Government of Filipinos organized	June 23, 1898.
First American Troops landed under command of General Anderson	June 30, 1898.
Filipino Republic proclaimed	July 3, 1898.
General Merritt arrives	July 25, 1898.
Filipinos, on request, withdraw part of Troops surrounding Manila	July 29, 1898.
Peace Protocol signed; Peace declared between Spain and United States	Aug. 12, 1898.
Spaniards surrender Manila	Aug. 13, 1898.
Insurgents evacuate Suburbs of Manila	Sept. 15, 1898.
Filipino Congress meets at Malolos	Sept. 15, 1898.
Meeting of Peace Commission at Paris	Oct. 1, 1898.
Spanish Commissioners accept offer of \$20,000,000	Nov. 28, 1898.
Treaty of Peace agreed to in Paris	Dec. 10, 1898.
Orders sent from Washington for Iloilo Expedition	Dec. 23, 1898.
Spanish Garrison at Iloilo surrenders to the Filipinos	Dec. 24, 1898.
Congress at Malolos adjourns	Dec. 26, 1898.
Americans demand surrender of Iloilo	Dec. 28, 1898.
President's Cablegram defining Policy received in Manila	Dec. 29, 1898.
Revised Cablegram proclaimed by General Otis	Jan. 5, 1899.
Counter Proclamation by Aguinaldo	Jan. 5, 1899.
Appointment of Schurman Commission	Jan. 16, 1899.
Constitution of Filipino Republic adopted	Jan. 21, 1899.
Outbreak of hostilities at Manila	Feb. 4, 1899.

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PART I.

THE ILOILO EPISODE.

INTRODUCTION.

Iloilo, on the Island of Panay, in the Visayan group of the Philippines, is a commercial centre second only in importance to Manila, from which it is distant about three hundred miles. In the first part of this pamphlet the editors propose to lay before the reader, in convenient form, the pages of the official reports that tell the story of the expedition detailed for Iloilo by General Otis on Christmas Eve, 1898. Except for these official reports little is known of this expedition. The press has given scant information concerning it; yet it is of the utmost significance to anyone desiring to understand the outbreak of hostilities on February 4th, 1899.

By the terms of capitulation agreed upon between Spain and the United States on August 13, 1898, the city, harbor, and bay of Manila were surrendered to the United States troops who took immediate possession. The rest of the archipelago remained nominally under the control of Spain, but actually for the most part under the control of the insurgents. (See statement of General Otis, page 8, below.)

During the autumn of that year our generals were engaged in negotiating for the occupation of certain positions in the immediate vicinity of Manila, held by the insurgents who had won them from the Spanish forces. The status of this disputed territory was not clearly defined by Spanish maps — General Otis asserted that it came properly under the head of suburbs, and he therefore demanded that the insurgents evacuate in favor of our troops. As time went on, however, and the insurgents seemed disinclined to give up peaceably any more of the territory surrounding Manila, and as events at home

indicated an early signing of the Treaty of Peace, the situation assumed a different aspect. In the words of General Otis: *

“The sphere of the United States action in the Philippines was now about to be enlarged. During the last interview with General Rios’s staff-officer on the subject of the inter-island trade, alluded to in a former portion of this report, he submitted a proposition for the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by our troops, saying that General Rios would be pleased to turn that city over to the United States authorities and withdraw to Zamboanga. The proposition was discussed, but immediate action was not considered practicable, and he was requested to convey to the general our appreciation of his offer and to report that permission would be sought to accept it as soon as the Paris treaty negotiations indicated unmistakably that the United States would succeed to the government of the islands.”

December 13, 1898, General Otis received a petition from certain business men in Iloilo, asking for American protection there. Next day he cabled to Washington telling of the petition, stating that the Spanish authorities were still holding out in Iloilo but would receive American troops, and asking for instructions.

December 23, those instructions arrived. “The President directs that you send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect life and property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.” General Otis at once cabled General Rios, in command of the Spanish troops at Iloilo, that he was sending a large American force. On the 24th, General Otis heard that General Rios intended to leave Iloilo that same day. “Efforts were immediately made,” says General Otis, “to communicate by other means with General Rios before he could evacuate the city.” Lieutenant-Colonel Potter was sent at once on a coasting vessel to Iloilo, “if possible [to] communicate in person with General Rios,

* Otis Report, page 54.

requesting that he continue in possession of the city until the arrival of our troops." On the same day two regiments of infantry and a light battery were put under command of Brig.-Gen. Marcus T. Miller, U. S. V., with orders to proceed to Iloilo, Island of Panay. The instructions to General Miller are quoted below, page 9. The expedition sailed on the evening of the 26th.

December 27, General Otis received a telegram from General Rios, stating that he had been ordered to Manila by his Government, and a telegram from the cable company stating that Iloilo had been evacuated on the 24th. These messages General Otis forwarded to Admiral Dewey with the statement that he was "inclined to think the Spaniards still hold Iloilo." Colonel Potter, however, returned on the morning of the 28th, with definite news of the evacuation of Iloilo. He was sent back to Iloilo immediately with modified instructions for General Miller (see page 12, below). December 30, General Otis cabled to Washington that "all military stations outside of Luzon, with the exception of Zamboanga, turned over by Spaniards to inhabitants," and that he was "waiting to hear results from Iloilo, and am meditating action in islands of Leyte, Samar, and Cebu, in all of which Luzon insurgents have been at work for several months." The later history of the Iloilo expedition is told in the following quotations.

[NOTE. Two very important facts are brought out by a study of the Iloilo incident.

I. Whereas we have commonly considered the Filipino insurrection as a rebellion of the Tagalogs only, the Visayans are shown by the following quotations to have identified themselves, even before the outbreak, with the Tagalog opposition to our rule, and to have been loyal subjects of the Malolos Government. It should be remembered that the Tagalogs and Visayans make up the great majority of the population of the Philippine Islands.

II. General Miller testifies to the orderly conduct of the

insurgents when Iloilo fell into their hands. This fact is in line with their humane treatment of Spanish prisoners, testified to by all our officers; and with General Anderson's statement* that good discipline was maintained by the several thousand armed Filipinos who forced their way into Manila with our troops. All of which is in sharp contrast to our wide-spread belief that the insurgents could not be trusted to respect life and property.]

Instructions given General Miller before General Otis knew of the evacuation of Iloilo.†

“OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR,

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

“*Manila, P. I., December 24, 1898.*

“Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,

“*Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.*

“SIR: In obedience to the instructions of the President of the United States, dated on the 23d instant, directing that troops be sent to Iloilo, Island of Panay, there to preserve peace and protect life and property, your command has been selected for this duty and has been ordered to depart therefor, on Monday next, the 26th instant.

“Those instructions contain the following cautionary language:

“It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.

“When they were given it was supposed that the Spanish forces in Iloilo and in conflict with the insurgent inhabitants of the Island, would retain their hold of the city until the arrival of the United States troops, when they would transfer all authority to the latter and peaceably evacuate. From cable dispatches received this morning from northern Panay,

* Report of Secretary of War for 1898, page 678.

† Otis Report, page 57.

it is feared that the Spanish troops may surrender the city to the insurgents before your arrival, in which event your duties will become more complicated, and will require delicate and skilful action for successful prosecution. However, every possible precautionary measure has been taken to retain the Spanish forces there. Yesterday a cablegram was sent to northern Panay, the limit of telegraphic communication with Iloilo, advising the commanding general of those forces of your early departure for that port, and this evening a fast vessel will be dispatched carrying the same information, but it is possible that these measures may fail to accomplish desired results.

“In the event of your arrival at Iloilo prior to the departure of the Spanish troops therefrom, you will communicate with their commanding general, inviting him, in accordance with an existing mutual understanding, to then remove his forces to permit you to take formal possession of the city, and thereupon with his consent you will proceed to occupy the same with your command. If, on the contrary, you find the city to be in the possession of the insurgents, you will proceed with great caution, avoiding all manifestation of meditated forcible action and undue display of force. You will place yourself in communication with the insurgent authorities through the representative men of Iloilo, whom you will take from Manila with you on your voyage, and who will use their best endeavors to bring to a successful determination any difficulties which may present themselves. You will make known to the inhabitants the purpose of the United States, which, having succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Philippine Islands, under treaty stipulations following conquest in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, intends to establish among them an efficient and most stable form of government which shall fully protect them in all their private interests and liberties, in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increasing and abundant prosperity. As a slight proof of your declared intention, you will release unto them the Spanish native soldiers, sent

here by the Spanish government, who, through the efforts of the United States authorities, will be returned to their homes in Panay, who will accompany you and who are grateful for the supervision which those authorities have exercised over them. You will find the representative people of Iloilo a superior class and amenable to reason and it is believed that they will place confidence in the faith and good intentions of the United States and will accord you a most favorable reception. No undue haste will be made and the rights of your government will be fully made known and insisted upon. Conflict between troops will be avoided unless it becomes necessary for defence. Should you be able to effect a landing as a result of your negotiations you will disembark only a sufficient portion of your command to subserve present purposes — the remainder being held on transports awaiting further instructions. Should you not be able to effect a landing without conflict you will hold your forces on your transports in the vicinity of Iloilo and await further directions from these headquarters. But in all these matters you must be governed to a great extent by your own good judgment after a careful deliberation upon conditions, having in view the instructions of the President of the United States to avoid armed repression.

[Details of instructions follow and are here omitted.]

“By command of Major-General Otis,

“THOMAS H. BARRY,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

[NOTE. Colonel Potter, it will be remembered, returned from Iloilo, December 28. “He reported that General Rios had evacuated on the evening of the 24th, thirty-nine hours before his arrival; that he found the insurgents in possession of the city; that he had landed and held an interview with the consul for Great Britain, and that the town was quiet, Aguinaldo’s flag flying, and that he could not reach any conclusions as to the probable results of General Miller’s arrival; that he saw the latter on the evening of the 27th and reported

to him fully the situation as he had found it." * General Otis at once sent Colonel Potter back with the following modified instructions.]

Modified Instructions for General Miller and Colonel Potter.†

"HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC & EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

"*Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.*

"Brig.-Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,

"*Commanding First Separate Brigade,*

"*Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, P. I.*

"SIR: Lieutenant-Colonel Potter has just arrived and reported the situation at Iloilo. He reports the evacuation of the city by the Spanish forces and that the insurgents are in full possession; he further reports that those authorities were anticipating your arrival, and that there was a widely prevailing sentiment in the city in favor of receiving your forces without resistance. All of this Colonel Potter informed me he made known to you when he consulted you yesterday on his return trip.

"To meet this state of affairs your instructions need modification, although it is believed that you will grasp the situation as presented, and be governed by conditions. Your instructions bid you to be conciliatory but firm, and further that you will not make any great display of force, but seek to gain possession of the city through peaceable negotiations, not exercising undue haste; that should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions.

"By firmness and conciliatory action it is believed that you will be able to land your force without conflict, but you will make as strong a display of the same as possible landing them and taking possession of the city forcibly if more paci-

* Otis Report, page 56.

† Ibid., page 50.

fic measures are without avail. It is, of course, necessary, now, in this stage of the proceedings, to occupy Iloilo, and the manner of doing so must be left to your discretion, avoiding conflict if possible, but accepting it if necessary to accomplish the object.

“Information received here to the effect that the insurgent forces are weak in strength even when united — that they are not united but are divided in their sentiments towards the United States Government, the majority being friendly disposed.

“No further instructions can be given you, and there is no disposition to limit your discretionary action. Conduct affairs in accordance with the demands of the situation, having in view always the necessity of occupying the city with your troops.

“Colonel Potter will return as soon as you report to him the situation, unless you wish to retain him for a short time to acquaint him with results of action already taken or action which you meditate. Very respectfully,

“E. S. OTIS,

“*Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.*

“LATER.

“Since writing the above I am in receipt of information from the Malolos Government, which was gathered yesterday. Its former cabinet resigned a few days ago, because of its inability to agree with Aguinaldo and his confidential advisers. A new provisional cabinet has been appointed, consisting of men hostile to American annexation, among whom are a number of army officers. These men are closely watching the results of your expedition and greatly hope that you will be obliged to use force to gain Iloilo. They think that conflict there would inspire the people here to take up arms against the Americans.

“It is therefore still quite necessary to avoid force if you can do so and still succeed.

E. S. OTIS,

“*Major-General, etc.*

“HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

“*Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.*”

“Lieut.-Col. C. L. POTTER, *Chief Engineer Officer,*

“*Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.*”

“SIR: Since delivering to you instructions for General Miller, I am in receipt of a despatch from Admiral Dewey saying it is not practicable to send the *Callao* to Iloilo, and he further thinks the proper thing to do now is to recall the expedition, as the insurgents are in full possession and will probably not give up without a fight. This expression of view on the part of the Admiral only confirms my view that you should use every possible means of conciliation, and still I am not of the belief that the expedition can be returned. Better that we leave the war vessel and a small force to confront Iloilo and scatter the force to other ports in the southern islands, where troops are very much needed at the present time. You will therefore inform General Miller to be governed by these views as nearly as possible. I will try and send further information in regard to the condition of the islands to-morrow or next day. Notwithstanding all this, I still hold to my view that Iloilo must be taken.

“Very respectfully, E. S. OTIS,

“*Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.*”

General Miller's First Report. *

“General Miller's first report was received at these headquarters on the morning of December 30, and was as follows:

“HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

“ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,

“*Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898 — 3 p. m.*”

“ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

“*Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.*”

“SIR: I have the honor to report that my command arrived in the harbor of Iloilo about 10 a. m. to-day. The *Arizona*

* Otis Report, page 61.

and *Pennsylvania* were left at Point Luzaron, thirty miles away. The *Baltimore* and *Newport* anchored off the city.

“An aid of the commanding general, Martin Delgado, immediately reported aboard my ship. I gave him an interview. He reported that the commanding general desired to know, ‘If we had anything against them — were we going to interfere with them?’ I informed him that I had written a letter stating to his commanding officer and the people of Iloilo the object of my visit, and would send the letter over. Accordingly, Lieutenant M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, and two volunteer aids and the commission went to visit the commanding general. They were met by a sub-committee, of the committee of which R. Lopez was president, General Delgado being present. My aids gave them my letter (a copy enclosed). They wanted to know of Lieutenant Barroll almost at the very first whether he had any instructions for them from Aguinaldo. He answered no: but that the instructions were from Major-General Otis, commanding the Philippine Islands, United States forces. After reading the letter they claimed that they had no power to act in cases affecting their federal government, but promised to meet me on my ship to-morrow afternoon. When we entered their flag was flying from two places in the city. At three p. m. to-day it was not flying. I presume this was because my letter claimed the authority of the Spanish government over Iloilo, as it was abandoned by the Spanish troops. They were polite, but I think them determined not to give us control, except we use force, when they will yield without much fighting. They have taken charge of the Custom House and Post Office. They know that our troop ships are off Point Luzaron, therefore I ordered them in to-night, not nearer than six miles.

“The city is quiet, but the white citizens, specially Americans, are afraid. Their force is estimated at 800 well armed men, 1000 badly armed men, and 1000 men with guns, pikes, etc.; ammunition not supposed to be abundant.

“I am told now that the members of the commission are afraid to express an opinion in our favor. The fact that their

people are in possession of the city has changed the views of the many wavering ones. The longer they remain in possession, collecting customs, running post offices, the more they will be confirmed in the idea that they can do it. I should recommend that force be used at once, in which case I desire the *Callao* or some other light draft boat and the California Heavy Artillery battalion sent down till the place is taken. With the forces now here and that in addition I would not expect to fire a single shot, as the native troops would move out. I will keep you informed.

“Very respectfully, M. P. MILLER,
 “*Brigadier-General, U. S. V.,*
 “*Commanding First Separate Brigade.*”

[NOTE: General Miller's second report, December 30, states that “a committee of people having civil control of the city of Iloilo, and claiming also control of the island,” stated to him “that they could not turn over the control of Iloilo to my command without consulting Aguinaldo.”*]

General Miller's Report of December 30.†

“General Miller's next report is dated December 30, and was received on January 2. It is as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS SEPARATE BRIGADE,
 “*Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.*

“COMMANDING GENERAL,
 “*Department of the Pacific, Manila, P. I.*

“SIR: I have just concluded second conference with commission representing the native government at Iloilo. They submitted a communication, copy inclosed herewith.

“This communication was supplemented by verbal statements that if we insisted on landing our troops, but without arms and as friends, they could not answer for the attitude of

* Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, page 51, and Otis Report, page 63.

† Otis Report, page 63.

the people, but that the army would endeavor to restrain the people. If we landed in force they would not answer for attitude of either army or people. This means, plainly, armed resistance to our landing.

“A large number of native troops have been brought to the city within the past thirty-six hours. Best estimate 12,000; 2,500 of which are armed with rifles, the remainder being armed with bolos only. Their ammunition supply reported limited.

“The situation is further complicated by petition of Iloilo merchants, representing the greater part of mercantile interests there, copy of which find herewith.

“I understand, General, that it was at the request of many of the parties signing this petition for protection of life and property at Iloilo that this expedition was organized and dispatched to this point; that their request was largely its justification. Their present attitude contradicts their previous petition in a measure, and as the situation, if forced by me by a landing of the United States troops, promises great loss of life among the non-combatants and destruction of private property at Iloilo, I have deemed it best to delay compliance with my orders for a sufficient time to communicate the above information to you and receive your instructions. I am further influenced to this delay because of the fact that before making the formidable attack upon Iloilo now necessary, it would be incumbent upon me to give the usual notice looking to the removal of noncombatants to points of safety.

“I entertain no doubt of my ability to take and hold Iloilo with my present force, but in view of excitement prevailing among inhabitants of the city and islands, reported to me, and the large number of people assembled in the city, it might be prudent to send an additional regiment to this point.

“Two steam launches, suitable for towing rowboats in landing troops, much needed. Very respectfully,

“M. P. MILLER,

“*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

“The inclosure reads :

“[TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT LOPEZ, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BISAYAS,* TO GENERAL MILLER.]

“GENERAL :

“Upon the return of your commissioners last night we determined and discussed in a definite manner the situation and the attitude of this reason of Bisayas, in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government of Luzon, and, in view of what these commissioners have manifested, I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and committee, we insist upon our pretension not to consent, in our present situation, to any foreign interference without expressed orders from the central government of Luzon, upon which we state once more, that we depend, and with which we are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices.

“Therefore, if you insist on your side upon disembarking your forces, this is our final attitude.

“May God give you, etc.

“R. LOPEZ, *President.*

“—— —, *Vice Secretary.*

“*Iloilo, December 30, 1898.*

“TO GENERAL MILLER.

“The petition of merchants bore the signatures of the leading business men of Iloilo, was of date December 29, and read as follows :

“General MILLER,

“*Commanding United States Forces, Iloilo Bay :*

“We, the undersigned, merchants of Iloilo, beg you to take into consideration our large interests and the probable result of a conflict with the natives, which, in our belief, would seriously prejudice and harm the trade of these islands for years to come. We ask you to consider the orders they have received from their chief, Aguinaldo, of Malolos.”

* Sometimes spelled Visayas.

“On the same date General Miller replied to this communication as follows :*

“HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
“ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
“*Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.*

“Mr. ROQUE LOPEZ,
“*President Estado Federal de Bisayas, Iloilo.*

“SIR: I have the honor to express my regret that your committee has concluded to offer armed resistance to the occupancy of Iloilo by the United States forces at this time. I shall wait for the present in a spirit of friendship, hoping that your opinion may change after reconsideration. I will give you timely notice of my intentions.

“Very respectfully,

“M. P. MILLER,
“*Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*”

Later Report from General Miller.†

“General Miller further reported on same date (probably a later hour of the day) that the situation remained unchanged, except it was rumored that two hundred armed men arrived at Iloilo from Negros. He continued:

“I this morning requested the commanding officer of the *Baltimore*, if compatible with his instructions, to take such measures as he deemed necessary to prevent the entrance of vessels carrying armed men into the Iloilo River. He happened in after I got my letter written, and I brought the subject up. Orally he informed me that he had no right to do this; that under his instructions he does not feel authorized to commence the attack, and acts in defence of our expedition only.

* Senate Document 208, page 53.

† Otis Report, page 64.

“The insurgents have occupied an old star fort at the point of the peninsula, the site of Iloilo, the fire of which sweeps beaches on which we intend to land. My troops have got to commence the attack; I therefore shall put a mountain and Gatling gun in boats and open fire on their fort and a storehouse near it filled with troops, at twenty-five hundred yards, thus inviting the captain of the *Baltimore* to help defend us by attacking the enemy to the best effect.

“We are aware that on the successful accomplishment of this contest depends the speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements in the islands. The insurgents raised their flag over the fort this morning. The action, as above-entitled, will be contingent on future instructions to be received from the department commander.

“Very respectfully,

“M. P. MILLER,

“*Brigadier-General, U. S. V.*”

General Otis's Summary.*

“The excitement in Manila and Malolos over the Iloilo affair became rapidly more intense and manifested itself in unmistakable signs of danger to the still languishing peace should an attack be made by our troops upon that city. Aguinaldo's government was now in full possession of very radical men, the majority of whom desired war in any event, and it was in a great measure dominated by his army. These men desired some immediate action on the part of the United States by which they might be able to arouse the opposition of the inhabitants against its troops, and anticipated hostilities at Iloilo appeared to them to offer the desired material.

“I had also incidentally heard from Iloilo that General Miller would probably meet with insurgent opposition should

* Otis Report, page 65.

he attempt to make a landing there. Knowing the great desire of the United States Government to maintain peace by all honorable means, maturely considering the situation in Luzon which had been so quickly developed, meditating the transfer later of more troops to Iloilo when the unnatural excitement should be allayed, and an opportunity presenting itself to communicate with General Miller by a British man-of-war, whose captain courteously offered to take any message I might desire to send, I sent on the evening of December 29 the following hastily prepared communication :

“HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 “*Manila, P. I., December 29, 1898.*

“Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
 “*Commanding First Separate Brigade*
 “*Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.*

“SIR : This will be delivered to you by Captain Montgomery, of the British navy, who leaves for Iloilo in the morning. I enclose copy of our translation of a cablegram received to-day in cipher, from which you will understand the position and policy of our Government toward these islands.

“Do not be in haste with your negotiations for the surrender of the city. Should there be strong and very decided opposition to your entry, backed by considerable force, do not be in haste. It will not do to bombard the city, nor will it do to let the natives loot and burn it. Foreigners have large possessions there and a great deal of money in the banks. You can remain in the harbor with your force. If you meet with decided or strong opposition, await there further instructions, and if necessary, I can direct a portion of your force to other ports in the southern islands, where you will not meet much, if any, opposition. I trust to your discretion.

“Very truly yours, E. S. OTIS,
 “*Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*

“I contemplated at the time the sending of the First California Volunteers to the southern waters as soon as conditions at Manila would justify the weakening of the

military force here, and immediately directed that regiment to be put in readiness for embarkation. It was placed on board five small merchant vessels, preparatory to sailing at any directed moment, was retained thereon for several days, when Luzon affairs indicating that it might be required for use in Manila in a short time, it was returned to its former barracks.

“The cablegram referred to in the above letter to General Miller was the proclamation of the President received in cipher. The translation was completed about an hour before the letter was written, and was transmitted to General Miller to inform him of the policy which the Government intended to pursue. Neither its contents nor feasibility of immediate issue had been carefully considered. No direction for its publication had been given, and it was not supposed that it would be proclaimed at Iloilo. The general, however, under the impression that it had been transmitted for publication, issued it very soon after it was received, and in his letter of January 6, informed me as follows :

Letters from General Miller.*

“Three days ago I sent to the governing committee (R. Lopez, President) a copy of the letter of instructions of the President, and asked that they permit the entry of my troops. No answer has been received, and I expect none. I had copies of the President’s instructions translated into Spanish and distributed to the people in various ways, and am informed that the people laugh at it. The insurgents call us cowards, and are fortifying the old fort at the point of the peninsula, and are mounting old smooth bore guns left by the Spaniards. They are intrenching everywhere, and are bent upon having one fight, and are confident of victory. As I informed you in my letter yesterday, I believe that we

* Otis Report, page 66.

can now capture the city with the force now present and with the assistance of the navy without the loss of much life and without much destruction of property, and, should we destroy it all, I believe it would be of advantage to the city, as a newer city would be built up soon. The character of the natives, having been under the subjugation of Spain so long, is such that, once well punished, they will submit to fate. The people are superstitious and believe in fate, and now believe that fate will give them victory.

“ His letter of the previous day, January 5, is as follows :

“ HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

“ ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,

“ *Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 5, 1899.*

“ ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

“ *Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.*

“ SIR: I have the honor to report the situation as quite serious. The native troops now number over four thousand well-armed men. There are more than twelve thousand armed with bolos and miscellaneous weapons. They are constantly intrenching about the fort and at the mouth of the Iloilo River. I do not allow any one on shore, as the insurgent commander sent me word that he would not be responsible for our unarmed men in town. * * * [*Stars are in Report.*]

“ Last evening about 6.40 o'clock, just at dark, while at supper, the captain of the water boat went toward the rear of the boat, where the guard was stationed, and suddenly sprang at the guard with a knife, cut the head of one of the guard through the skull, and the other one on the arm and jaw; the latter was knocked overboard, and then struck by the native on the land with an oar. One native then jumped overboard and escaped; the others were secured. A boat from the ship was lowered and picked up the soldier in the water, who is not badly hurt. The soldier cut on the head is likely to die, but there is a slight hope of his recovery.

“ I think the longer we wait before attack the harder it will be to put down the insurrection.

“ The city is entirely at the mercy of the *Baltimore*, and with her assistance, advancing under her guns and Captain Bridgman's battery, I have no doubt we can drive the insurgents out of the city, but their army will confront us outside. That situation would be intolerable, even if firing ceases. I would therefore recommend that a force sufficient to beat them badly in the open field should be prepared ready to send down, if required, after the city is taken. Let no one convince you that peaceful measures can settle the difficulty here unless you first settle matters peacefully in Manila and Luzon Island. * * * [*Stars are in Report.*]

“ The English and German war ships and all other large vessels in the harbor have daily received refugees from the city. Many of the city people with their effects are leaving on small coasting steamers for neighboring islands.

“ Order appears to be maintained in the city, except for Americans who feel humiliated and want to get at them.

“ Very respectfully,

“ M. P. MILLER,

“ *Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*”

General Otis's Statement Concerning Amended Proclamation.*

“ After fully considering the President's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalogs with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as ‘sovereignty,’ ‘right of cession,’ and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread

* Otis Report, page 66.

hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain words, as 'sovereignty,' 'protection,' etc., had peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed. It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the paper, that the beneficent object of the United States Government would be brought clearly within the comprehension of the people, and this conclusion was the more readily reached because of the radical change of the past few days in the constitution of Aguinaldo's government, which could not have been understood at Washington at the time the proclamation was prepared."

Letter from President Lopez to General Miller. *

"On the thirty-first day of December, the President, R. Lopez, wrote a second letter couched in the following language :

"General MILLER :

"GENERAL: I heartily concur in your wishes, which is also ours, to arrange matters in a spirit of good friendship, but not having the power to surrender the city and the port of Iloilo, which having been taken by our forces in the name of the Filipino Republic, whose central government resides in Malolos, I regret finding myself in the position of the persisting in not consenting to the landing of your forces without the direct orders of the central government.

"I trust that you will see the justice of our claim compacted by the will of the people explicit declared last night at the great meeting called for the purpose.

"May God give you — ,

"The President,

R. LOPEZ.

"PRESIDENT'S HOUSE IN THE CITY OF JARO,

"December 31, 1898."

* Senate Document 208, page 53.

General Miller's Letter Transmitting the President's Cablegram.*

"On January 1, General Miller transmitted to Señor Lopez the instructions of His Excellency, the President of the United States of December 28, relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands. In transmitting this proclamation General Miller wrote as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
 "EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 "ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
 "*Iloilo Harbor, January 1, 1898.*

"Mr. ROQUE LOPEZ, *President.*

"SIR: The within cablegram from the President of the United States to the United States Military Governor in the Philippines, transmitted by the latter to me yesterday, is enclosed herewith † for the information of your committee and of the people of Iloilo and Panay Island. Its more important statements are :

"I. That the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to forces of the United States, followed by the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Paris on the tenth instant, operate to give the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands to the United States.

"II. It authorizes and directs the military commander in the Philippines to extend, *with all possible dispatch*, ‡ the military government heretofore maintained in the city, harbor and bay of Manila to the whole of the Philippine group.

"III. It directs that the military government to be established among you shall be exerted for the security of persons and property of the people of the Island and for the conformation [*confirmation?*] of their private rights and relations. It

* Senate Document 208, page 54.

† Italics as in Report.

See Appendix A, page 68.

announces to you that the army does not come among you as invaders and conquerors, but as friends to establish and maintain a government which will accord to the people what is the heritage of all free peoples — the full measure of individual rights and liberty.

“The forces here under my command have been sent to this point for the purpose of executing the above orders. Although fully conscious of my power to occupy the city at any moment, I have, nevertheless, waited, that you might have ample time to fully deliberate upon the questions presented. As indicated in the President’s cablegram under existing conditions, the people of Panay Island owe obedience to the political authority of the United States, and grave responsibilities will be incurred if, after deliberation, it is decided to resist that authority. In obedience to my instructions, and in the belief that the highest interests of the people will be served by immediate occupation by the troops under my command and the establishment of the authority of the United States, I again express the desire that the native troops be withdrawn, thus assuring the entry of the forces under my command without unusual incident or menace to life and property interests in Iloilo.

“I am, very respectfully,

“M. P. MILLER,

“*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*”

General Otis’s Summary.*

“General Miller thought his action in making publication of the proclamation on January 3 correct, as he had not been instructed to the contrary, and his opinion, he contended, was confirmed by a War Department dispatch which I had directed Colonel Potter to deliver to him and which he had received on January 6. He was satisfied that the use he had made of the proclamation was that contemplated by the War Department authorities, but it was not long before it

*Otis Report, page 67.

was delivered at Malolos and was the object of venomous attack.

“ Nothing further of great moment transpired at Iloilo for several successive days, and we return to the narrative of Manila events. General Miller, however, remained eager for battle, and with his command restive under the taunts of the natives and criticisms of foreign citizens, he repeatedly asked for permission to attack the city. Complications of a civil nature were also arising as shown in his communication of January 8, of which the following is a copy :

General Miller's Report of January 8.*

“ HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 “ ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
 “ *Iloilo Harbor, P. I., Sunday, January 8, 1899, — 2 p. m.*
 “ ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND
 EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.—

“ SIR : I have the honor to report, for the information of the major-general commanding, that the situation here is not improving since my last report. I have not landed the Fifty-first Iowa on the island opposite to Iloilo, as two boat crews of troops of the Fifty-first Iowa landed on the 5th inst., and were met by over 75 to 100 natives armed with various weapons, rifles, shotguns, and knives, who asked them their business and warned them off with threats of bringing out more troops if they did not go away. The men of the regiment are well, and the colonel does not desire to land under such circumstances of hostility. The insurgents are still at work fortifying ; last night they sunk four mud scows at the mouth of the Iloilo River to prevent the passage of our Navy. This did not annoy us, as the *Petrel's* place for action, if we have one, is undisturbed. The city is so completely under the control of the war vessels of the navy that we are indif-

*Otis Report, page 67.

ferent as to what the insurgents do. When the time comes nothing can save insurgents in the city but flight. The subject most disturbing to our American minds is the fact that a Dutch ship is loading with sugar ; who shall collect the duty is a question. Captain Evans and I discussed the question last evening without conclusion. The duties will amount to \$5,000, quite a snug sum, with which the insurgents will be able to buy machine guns, etc., if we leave them alone. Other ships arriving will add more and more to their revenues.

“The port ought to be closed, if it is a practicable thing, after due notice to foreign governments. We need here two good steam launches capable of towing a line of rowboats rapidly, for landing purposes. We cannot get them here without seizing them, and the good ones are under the protection of foreign flags.

“As to the insurgents yielding to the order of the President and allowing occupation, it will not be done unless the central government at Malolos directs them to do so. If we have to fight at Manila and here, I should think it better to strike the first blow here, as, with the assistance of the navy, result in our favor can scarcely be doubted.

“Very respectfully,

“M. P. MILLER,

“*Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*”

Correspondence between President Lopez and General Miller.*

“On January 9 General Miller received the following letter from Señor R. Lopez, in reply to his of January 1 :

“General MILLER.

“GENERAL : We have the high honor of having received your message, dated January 1, of this year, enclosing letter of President McKinley. We have deliberated about these

* Senate Document 208, pages 54-56.

points, and as a result of our deliberations, we deduce an answer to one of its clauses. We are not able to enter into discussion respecting the others, because it is not in the power of this Council of State.

“You say in one clause of your message: ‘As indicated in the President’s cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants of the Island of Panay ought to obey the political authority of the United States, and they will incur a grave responsibility if, after deliberating, they decide to resist said authority.’

“So the council of state of this region of Visayas are, at this present moment, between the authority of the United States that you try to impose on us, and the authority of the Central revolutionary government at Malolos. The supposed authority of the United States began with the treaty of Paris on the tenth of December, 1898. The authority of the central government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices, etc. It is also founded principally on our political constitution, which began at the insurrection, and has been manifested in all its doings, so that the authority of the government of Malolos over us began at a date long before the treaty of Paris.

“Now, after consideration, please tell us with sincerity, General, what authority we should obey, whether the authority of the United States, which began with the treaty of Paris on the 10th of December, 1898, of which we do not know officially, because the revolutionary government of Malolos has not been notified; which government is based upon previous conquest, anterior to the said treaty, and the natural bonds created by politics and the constitution established since the first moment of the rebellion on the 11th of August, 1896.

“After all has been said we insist in not giving our consent to the disembarkation of your troops without an express, order from our central government of Malolos.

“The President,

R. LOPEZ.

“JARO, January 9, 1899.

“On January 11 General Miller replied to the letter of Señor R. Lopez of the 9th, as follows :

“HEADQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
 “EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 “ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
 “*Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 11, 1899.*

“MR. R. LOPEZ, *President Federal State of Bisayas.*

“SIR: I have the honor and pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of January 9, and regret very much your final conclusion does not conform to the order of the President of the United States which announces sovereignty over all these islands. You must rest assured in the end that the sovereignty will be maintained, whatever obstruction may temporarily intervene. The President is very desirous for the people of the Philippine Islands to accept the authority of the United States as friends and without compulsion. You ask me in your letter to tell you, in sincerity, why your people should acknowledge authority of the United States now, rather than the authority of your central government. The President's order tells why you should acknowledge the authority of the United States; that is because of the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. The United States in naval and land battles in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila compelled Spain to relinquish authority over the Philippine Islands to the United States. To this end she expended millions of dollars and thousands of lives, causing first the adoption of the protocol and finally the treaty. Every nation in the world recognizes the treaty as giving to the United States the same rights in the Philippine Islands as Spain formerly possessed. These rights of our government were duly considered at Washington, prior to the President issuing his order, and, no doubt, on the best legal advice in accordance with international law. I might say that the confederation of which you claim to be a part, is not now acknowledged by any nation, and its existence is only

accidental as a result of the war between Spain and the United States.

Very respectfully,

“ M. P. MILLER,
“ *Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*

“ Also as follows : —

“ HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
“ EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
“ ON BOARD THE TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
“ *Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 11, 1899.*

“ Mr. R. LOPEZ, *President Federal State of Bisayas.*

“ SIR : I will be glad at any time to receive any of your people, and especially yourself, who wish to consult me, on board the *Newport*. They will be safe and can return at their pleasure. We are making no seizures of boats or property, except that necessary to maintain our existence here on transports.

“ Very respectfully,

“ M. P. MILLER.
“ *Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*”

Interview of Lieutenant Phelan with the Government of Bisayas.*

“ On the same date Acting Asst. Surg. Henry Du R. Phelan appeared before the general committee of the so-called Estado Federal De Bisayas, Iloilo, and concerning which he submits the following report :

“ *Report of an interview between Lieut. Henry Du R. Phelan, acting assistant surgeon, Sixth Artillery, with the government of the Federal State of Bisayas.*

“ ILOILO, January 11, 1899.

“ At the meeting were present : President Roque Lopez and Generals Martin Delgado, Ananio Diocno, Pablo Araneta, chief of expeditionary forces from Manila, and various other

* Senate Document 208, page 56.

military chiefs ; Lawyer Raimundo Melliza, Francisco Soriano, and others.

“ General Miller’s letter was presented and handed over to the interpreter, and also the letter of Major-General Otis, which was given by General Miller to Lieutenant Woodward to be read before the meeting. Both these letters were then read and the discussion opened. Lawyer Raimundo Melliza did most of the talking on behalf of the government, and he said in effect, replying to General Miller’s letter, that all that the Americans owned was Manila. I said : ‘ Without us you would not have accomplished any results. When the war commenced there was actually no rebellion in these islands and you took advantage of our war and again rose in revolt. At the beginning of it your chiefs were not here, having fled the country.’ The President and the lawyer denied this, saying that their chiefs had gone abroad to purchase arms, and that although they were not in actual warfare their government was still in existence, and in fact they had been in constant rebellion since 1896, since Spain had never lived up to her agreement with Aguinaldo at the time of his withdrawal from the country. Referring to the sacrifices of lives and money which the United States had made in conquering this country the lawyer said that they also had made great sacrifices in lives and that they had a right to this country which they had fought for, and that we are now to take from them what they had won by fighting ; that they had been our allies, and we had used them as such ; and that now we are not showing them any gratitude for the help they gave us. I replied that we both worked together and had driven the Spanish out, and that they are now getting their liberty as a result. They felt hurt about the words ‘ The sovereignty of Spain and of the United States ’ which appeared in our communications, and said it was simply changing from one to another, and, while they knew the Spaniards they did not know us. I told them that we are different from any European nation, and of an entirely different character from the Spaniards ; that the people of Manila like us ; that we spent a

great deal of money in their city and that business was thriving there as it had not been before.

“Mr. Melliza said it would take two years for them to know us, and meanwhile we would establish a military government here, taking charge of all their offices. I replied that military occupation was a necessity for a time, and that it was customary to establish one in new possessions, and that as soon as order was assured it would be withdrawn. All that we wish now is to control the custom house, the post-office, the captaincy of the port, and to establish good order in the city. They smiled at this and remarked: ‘We have fought for independence and feel that we have the power of governing and need no assistance; we are showing it now. You might inquire of the foreigners if it were not so.’ They inquired the meaning of the word ‘territory’ as differing from State. I explained to them what a territorial and a state government was, and assured them that their liberty would be practically as great under such territorial or state government as if they were independent, and, moreover, that they would be free from any foreign interference. Mr. Melliza replied smilingly: ‘Since you say you are so friendly and wish to grant us so much liberty, why not have us a protectorate?’ I told him that I had no power to discuss that, that our order was to occupy all the islands. They stated that their orders were not to allow us to disembark, and that they were powerless to allow us to come in without express orders from their government. I asked them why they had not communicated with Aguinaldo, adding that we had waited patiently for ten days for a reply. They said it was partly our fault because they wanted us to give them a vessel to take their commission back to Manila. I told them that we had no vessels to spare.

“Mr. Francisco Soriano, one of the commissioners on the transport *Newport* with us, took the floor and said: ‘On Wednesday evening, before Christmas, General Otis promised the commission sent by him on the *Newport* that they should ask the North Americans for a steamer in case they would be

unable to solve some urgent questions regarding the government of the Bisayas, in order that they might consult the central government.' This promise was made known to them according to Francisco Soriano, by Mr. John MacLeod, on the morning of December 25, 1898.

"I asked what proof he had to offer, as I knew nothing of this promise. He replied that he had no written proof, as the promises were made verbally. I told him that the city was in our power and that we could destroy it at any time but we did not wish to commit a hostile act but wanted to land as friends. Lawyer Melliza replied that he cared nothing about the city; that we could destroy it if we wished; that it was not theirs, as the foreigners owned about all the property. 'We will withdraw to the mountains and repeat the North American Indian warfare. You must not forget that.'

"In regard to the claim that we made of the Philippine Islands by right of conquest and treaty stipulations, Lawyer Melliza said: 'International law forbids a nation to make a contract in regard to taking the liberty from its colonies. Iloilo was never surrendered to you; you have no right to it. It was ceded to us by General Rios, who, upon retiring, granted us our liberty and thus recognized our independence.' I replied that whatever agreement General Rios might have made with them at the time of his withdrawal from Iloilo was illegal as it was posterior to the treaty of Paris. Lawyer Melliza replied that they knew nothing of the treaty of Paris as they had not received any information concerning it; that they were bound by the central government of Luzon only. I told them that their government was not recognized by any nation; that all the world was aware of the cession of the Philippines to the United States by the treaty of Paris. He replied that it mattered not, as they now had agents in Europe seeking recognition for their government. Upon inquiring when they had last heard of Aguinaldo, Lawyer Melliza replied that they had heard from him about January 5, 1899, via Capiz; that the message had been brought by Gen. Ananio Diocno and Gen. Pablo Araneta to the effect

that Aguinaldo wanted the Bisayas government not to allow the landing of American forces until an agreement had been made with him.

“They then requested once more that commissioners be sent to Malolos to obtain the orders of Aguinaldo, and desired them to be sent at once. I asked Lawyer Melliza if Aguinaldo said we could occupy the city would they agree to it. He replied emphatically they would.

“At the conclusion of the meeting it was said that, as this question involved the integrity of the entire Republic, it could not be further discussed here but must be referred to the Malolos government.”

General Otis's Cautionary Advice to General Miller.*

“On the 15th of January the following letter was sent by the department commander :

“MANILA, P. I., *January* 15, 1899.

“MY DEAR GENERAL:

I am somewhat exercised, fearing that your correspondence with the Iloilo people may result in bringing about grave complications. I sent you the President's proclamation, not for publication, but for your information simply. It came just before Colonel Potter sailed for Iloilo and I did not have time to consider its probable effect. As soon as I could do so I cabled Washington that it would not be published as the time was not opportune. After some deliberation we put out one of our own which it was believed would suit the temper of the people. I also fear that your conversations and letters to the Iloilo insurgent authorities on the intention of the United States Government will also breed trouble.

“I have concluded to send Major Mallory to you ; he can represent my views and give you full information as to the policy which we have pursued here. He can give you a cor-

* Senate Document 208, page 58.

rect report of affairs in this section and show you how necessary it is to proceed with great caution.

“The revolutionary government is very anxious for peaceful relations, and knows the value of United States protection; but unfortunately some of their radical representatives have raised a flood of excitement which they cannot control and which they confess their inability to direct. We have had several conferences, and they plead with us to make some concessions which they may publish to their people in order that they can get out of the dilemma in which they have placed themselves. They have little idea of constitutional government and their people have none. They cried for ‘independence’ and ‘protection’ not knowing the true meaning of the terms and grow enraged over the words ‘sovereignty,’ ‘United States control,’ etc. For several days we have been passing through, and are still in, a rather critical condition. Had you fired a gun at Iloilo the mob and the insurgent troops were ready to make demonstration against the United States authorities. This would have been most disappointing to the President of the United States, who continually urges extreme caution and no conflict. Conditions are improving, the city is quiet, the Malolos government slowly disintegrating, I think, and the Philippine people of the city and surrounding provinces have a better understanding of the United States’ intention.

“Major Mallory will remain with you and I desire that you consult him upon all matters affecting our relationship with the insurgent authorities. The policy to be pursued by the United States is to keep as quiet as possible, permitting the insurgent authorities to work out their own protection if possible. Please do not attempt any radical action without consulting us here.

“Very respectfully,

“E. S. OTIS.

“Brig. Gen. M. P. MILLER,

“*Commanding First Separate Brigade,*

“*Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Island of Panay.*”

Trade Complications at Iloilo.

[NOTE: General Miller's command was still retained in the harbor of Iloilo. Later in the month General Otis writes: "It continued to be greatly dissatisfied because it was no allowed to seize the city." On January 20 General Miller writes as follows:*

"The people here will follow the conditions in Luzon and will permit our military occupation of Iloilo as soon as ordered from the central government. Outwardly the best terms of friendship exist personally between us. I have informed them verbally that they could go on with their usual occupations, afloat and ashore, without interference from us; that seizures we made were necessities merely to enable us to get along from day to day and that nothing would be taken otherwise. They are satisfied apparently, believe me most implicitly, and everything is pleasant."

During this time, General Otis states:†

"The merchant vessels entering and leaving Iloilo with subsistence and merchandise and plying their trade between that point, Manila, Singapore, and the Chinese coast, paying duty to the Iloilo insurgents in defiance of protest, became objects of suspicion, and their transaction enabled the avowed enemy to obtain food and reap revenue, much to the detriment of our interests."

General Miller complained of this fact to General Otis and requested "to be permitted to close the Iloilo port, or compel all traders to pay accustomed duties to his proper officers."

General Otis replied that "the port of Iloilo is not in actual possession of the United States forces," and "until the ratification of the treaty of peace the United States has not the legal right to occupy the port of Iloilo except by the consent of Spain."

* Otis Report, page 83.

† Ibid., page 85.

General Otis further states, "Conditions are so complicated that these headquarters do not feel at liberty to give positive instructions for your guidance, and they will be sought from Washington, which as soon as received will be transmitted to you."

The instructions from Washington received January 21 were as follows: "The President desires no forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs duties at Iloilo."]

Further Word From General Miller.*

"Still General Miller was greatly dissatisfied with his surroundings. He could not perform military service, nor could he conduct business affairs. He was kept watching and waiting under very unpleasant circumstances, which grew more irksome every passing day. On February 3, the day previous to the opening of actual hostilities at Manila, he wrote:

"HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

"ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,

"*Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 3, 1899.*

"THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

"*Department of the Pacific, Eighth Army Corps.*

"SIR: I have the honor to report military situation here unchanged. The insurgents are reported to be placing another gun in position. This is outside and near the entrance to the fort, bearing on our ships.

"The insurgents in town are to-day having a little trouble. Two companies in the main barracks demanded some pay and better food, and threatened to take up their arms and go back into the country if they were not paid. The row is not yet settled. Some \$15,000—export and import duty—have been received in the collector's office, and I presume the troops want a part of that.

* Otis Report, page 87.

“Reports from the southern islands, Negros and Cebu, are to the effect that those people realize that they cannot succeed with an independent government and want us to take possession.

“I still feel that this place — Iloilo — ought to be captured. Such a step would deprive the insurgents of large receipts from customs, cripple their means to pay soldiers, and arouse the people favorable to us in the southern islands to express more freely their true sentiments. I am well satisfied that a large proportion of the inhabitants of Panay, Negros, and Cebu are favorable to our occupation at once.

“A large proportion of the supplies for the Iloilo people come from the American steamers from Manila, a trade which is carried on through the collector of the port of Manila with the insurgents at Iloilo. Is there no way to stop this trade? Cutting off supplies in this way will help to bring these people to terms. I can't understand how such a business can be carried on against the best good of our country.

“Very respectfully,

“M. P. MILLER,

“*Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*”

[NOTE: On February 4th, the day after the above letter from General Miller, came the outbreak of hostilities at Manila, followed two days later by the ratification of the Treaty of Peace in Congress. Thus the two difficulties in the way of the capture of Iloilo were almost simultaneously removed. General Otis says: *

“The territory was no longer Spain's, but we still hesitated to take decisive action for fear of provoking the insurgents, or really giving them the excuse to attack us which they desired. Now this last obstacle had been removed by their determined onslaughts on Manila, and it was very important for over-mastering political reasons to take possession of these southern ports through force or otherwise as circumstances might demand. Notwithstanding our military

* Otis Report, page 103.

strength at Manila was so limited that we could not pursue into the interior the fleeing enemy, we knew our ability to worst him should he appear anywhere in our vicinity, and concluded that exigencies compelled us to clear up the field which we were confronting at Iloilo."

On February 8th, General Otis, having obtained permission from Washington to take Iloilo, instructed General Miller to proceed as soon as practicable. The city was bombarded on February 11th, by the *Baltimore* and *Petrel* of the United States Navy. The insurgents retired before the landing of our troops, firing the city as they retreated.]

PART II.

STRAINED RELATIONS IN MANILA,
January, 1899.

INTRODUCTION.

The situation in Manila, which General Otis described December 30, 1898, as requiring delicate manipulation, had daily grown more strained. On January 4 General Otis published an amended form of the President's cablegram, already issued by General Miller in its original form.

"Aguinaldo," says General Otis,* "met the proclamation by a counter one, in which he indignantly protested against the claim of sovereignty by the United States in the islands, which really had been conquered from the Spaniards through the blood and treasure of his countrymen, and abused me for my assumption of the title of military governor. Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that, after all the men were killed, they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country. The efforts made by Aguinaldo and his assistants made a decided impression on the inhabitants of Luzon outside of Manila, who acquired an unfavorable opinion, to say the least, of an American citizen, whom, of course, few of them had ever seen. The insurgent army was especially affected by this tirade of abuse of Americans, but agreeably so, as it had met and conquered the soldiers of Spain, and only awaited an opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility in war with the United States troops cooped up in Manila, and whom it had commenced to insult and charge with cowardice."

* Otis Report, page 70.

General Otis continues : *

“From August, 1898, to the time the treaty of Paris came from the representatives of the contracting Governments, the insurgents had maintained their military lines around Manila on the plea that they desired to be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain should she return to her late possessions. As soon as the result of the treaty negotiations became known, the dishonesty of that plea became fully apparent. Then the crisis in the insurgent government was at hand. Aguinaldo and his able adviser, Mabini, a man who had furnished the brains for the radical element, and who, in fact, was the government, proposed to transfer the declaration of open hostilities from Spain to the United States. This the conservative members of the cabinet and congress would not countenance, and the result was their withdrawal. Mabini was able to form a new cabinet with himself as Dictator, and to dominate the remaining members of congress. Independence was the cry, and the extermination of the Americans the determination. They then sought an excuse to inaugurate hostilities, but the United States had kept strictly within its legal rights and had simply performed its international obligations. Repeated efforts were made to secure some mark of recognition for their government from the American authorities, some of which appeared to be quite cunningly devised. I was addressed by so-called ministers of state on diplomatic subjects, and was visited by accredited members of the Malolos government. The various foreign consuls resident in Manila were officially informed by this government of its proceedings and furnished with copies of its so-called decrees. Never since the time Aguinaldo returned to Cavite, in May of 1898, and placed himself under the masterful spirit of Mabini, had he the slightest intention to accept the kind offices and assistance of the United States, except as they might be employed to hold Spain throttled while he worked the scheme of self-aggrandize-

* Otis Report, page 75.

ment. His success was not in the least astonishing, as after the various islands had driven out the few remaining and discouraged soldiers of their openly declared enemy, they naturally turned to Luzon for some form of central government, the islands of the south being well aware of their inability to maintain successful separate and distinct political establishments. The crude one in process of formation in central Luzon offered itself through the visiting agents and was accepted in part (notwithstanding race animosities and divergent business interests), and very probably because no other alternative was offered. The eight months of opportunity given the ambitious Tagalo by the hold on Spain, which the United States maintained, was sufficient also for him to send his troops and designing men into the distant provinces, and hold the unarmed natives in subjection while he imposed military authority; and thus, in December, 1898, we find in northern and southeastern Luzon, in Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay, and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the aggressive Tagalo, present in person, and, whether civilian or soldier, supreme in authority. The success which attended the political efforts of Aguinaldo and his close associates and gave them such sudden and unexpected power was not calculated to induce them to accept subordinate positions in a re-established government, and the original premeditated intention to control supremely at least a portion of the Filipino people, had become firmly fixed. The cry for liberty and independence (really license and despotism, under their governing methods) and the vile aspersions of the motives of the United States, which they have widely circulated, have served them to stir up distrust and fear of the American among the people to a considerable extent, especially those of Tagalo origin. Then the pretext that the United States was about to substitute itself for Spain, continuing all her former governing abuses, including the imposed authority of the hated friar, was resorted to and had its effect on the ignorant masses. Whatever action the United States might now

take, except to immediately withdraw its authority and subject the people to anarchy and the European vast property interest in these islands to destruction, could be so tortured as to support this pretext. It was eagerly waited for by the now irresponsible band of conspirators at Malolos, few of whom had anything to lose and everything to gain by inciting hostility. The United States' proclamation, issued on the 4th of January, offered them the first opportunity, and was the opportunity which they desired. No sooner was it published than it brought out a virtual declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the wretchedly advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5, issued the following." (See Appendix B, page 70.)

In this proclamation Aguinaldo outlines his version of events from May 1, 1898, vehemently protesting against the policy pursued by our government. He sums up the insurgents' various concessions of military positions; denounces Admiral Dewey for seizing the Filipino launches, and in particular protests against the Iloilo expedition, which, he says, was sent, "with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government."

The proclamation closes: "My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind. Upon their heads be all the blood that is shed."

The later events are recorded in the extracts given below :

General Otis's Comment on Aguinaldo's Proclamations. *

“The unmistakable intention of Aguinaldo, as shown in these proclamations, taken in connection with the well-known fact that what remains of his congress was subservient to Mabini's dictation, was ample notice to the troops to prepare for hostile demonstrations on the part of the insurgent army. Greater precautionary measures were directed and taken in the way of re-distributing organizations throughout the city, in advancing and strengthening (though still far within our own mutually conceded military lines) our posts of observation, and for the quick response of the men if summoned for defensive action. Otherwise no change in the conduct, condition, or temper of the troops was observable. So quietly were these precautions effected that Filipino citizens, noticing the apparent indifference of our men, warned me repeatedly of the danger to be apprehended from a sudden, simultaneous attack of the insurgents within and without the city, and were quietly informed that we did not anticipate any great difficulty. Another very noticeable proof of premeditated intent on the part of the insurgents was perceived in the excitement manifested by the natives and their removal in large numbers from the city. All avenues of exit were filled with vehicles transporting families and household effects to surrounding villages. The railroad properties were taxed to their utmost capacity in carrying the fleeing inhabitants to the north within the protection of the established insurgent military lines. Aguinaldo, by written communications and messages, invited his old-time friends to send their families to Malolos, where their safety was assured, but Hongkong was considered a more secure retreat and was taken advantage of. A carefully prepared estimate showed that 40,000 of the inhabitants of the city departed within the period of fifteen days.”

* Otis Report, page 79.

Cable to General Otis from Washington.*

“Early in the month I had cabled the authorities at Washington that open hostilities at Iloilo meant war throughout the islands, and that I had cautioned General Miller and the troops at Iloilo Harbor; and on the ninth instant I received a joint despatch signed by the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and addressed to Admiral Dewey and myself, conveying the instructions and suggestions of the President, which were in part as follows:

“Am most desirous that conflict should be avoided. Your statement that a conflict at Iloilo or at any other southern ports means war in all the islands increases that desire. Such conflict^o would be most unfortunate considering the present, and might have results unfavorably affecting the future. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring on hostilities. Time given the insurgents cannot injure us, and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purposes and recognize that before we can give them good government our sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential at this time.† . . . We accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interests of their inhabitants, and for humanity and civilization. Our sacrifices were made with this humane motive. We desire to improve the condition of the inhabitants, seeking their peace, liberty, and pursuit of their highest good. . . . Will send commissioners if you think desirable to co-operate with you both in your delicate task. They cannot leave here for two weeks or reach Manila for two months. . . . If possible to hasten repatriation of Spanish soldiers before the treaty is ratified it will be done. . . . Hope good counsel will prevail among the inhabitants, and that you will find means to avoid bloodshed and restore tranquillity to that unhappy island. How is the health of Miller’s command?”

* Otis Report, page 79.

† In every case omissions follow Report.

General Otis's Reply.*

"When this despatch was shown to Admiral Dewey he immediately remarked that he had recommended a commission, and desiring to be in accord with him, I cabled as follows :

"MANILA, P. I., *January 10, 1899.*

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington.*

"Have conferred with Admiral Dewey. We think commissioners of tact and discretion could do excellent work here. Great difficulty is that leaders cannot control ignorant classes. Health of Miller's command good.

"I also cabled :

"Our troops well in hand and confident that we can meet emergencies. Long conference last night and concessions asked, but insurgents have no definite idea of what they want. Further conference to be held. If peace kept for a few days more, immediate danger will have passed.

"The injunctions of his Excellency, the President of the United States, to exert ourselves to preserve the peace, had an excellent effect upon the command. Officers and men, confident of their ability to successfully meet the declared enemy, were restless under the restraints which had been imposed and were eager to avenge insults received. Now they submit very quietly to the taunts and aggressive demonstrations of the members of the insurgent army who continue to throng the streets of the business portions of the city."

Insurgent Appeal for Joint Commission.*

"Subsequent to January 5, and before the President's message had been received, I was approached by influential Filipino gentlemen (through an agent, an American citizen,

* Otis Report, page 80.

they fearing that their individual safety would be endangered should they call in person) who expressed a strong desire for continued peace and harmonious settlement of difficulties. They asked me to appoint a commission which could confer with one to be appointed by the Malolos government, with a view to working out a plan for the adjustment of the conflicting political interests of the parties concerned. Reply was made that the so-called Malolos government could not be officially recognized by word or act, but that I would gladly call a board of officers to confer with one which General Aguinaldo might appoint. The gentlemen made two or three hurried trips to Malolos, and on January 9 I received the following communication :

Correspondence between General Otis and Aguinaldo.*

“MALOLOS, *January 9, 1899.*

“Major-General E. S. OTIS,

“*General of the American Forces of
Occupation in Manila.*

“GENERAL: I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.

“Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general, ‘who cannot be recognized.’ Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, I have considered it advisable to name, as ‘commanding general,’ a commission composed of the following gentlemen : Mr. Florentino Flores, Eufrazio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you

* Otis Report, page 80.

will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your government and troops.

"If you will deign to attend to said commissioners and through these methods come to some understanding, 'if only temporary,' that will insure the peace and harmony among ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

"I am, yours, General, with the highest consideration, your most respected servant,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

"Reply was at once made to Aguinaldo's peculiar letter, and was expressed in the following terms :

"HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
"Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

"General EMILIO AGUINALDO,

"Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

"GENERAL : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day, and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

"In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to conduct its affairs under the limits which its Constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my government, unless specifically authorized to do so by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make the inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and

answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

“ Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by a thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops, and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depend upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the whole world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it; and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

“ Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

“ E. S. OTIS,

“ *Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*”

General Otis's Report of Joint Conferences.*

“ The representative boards engaged in joint conference on the evening of the day the order was issued, and had repeated and prolonged evening sessions, sometimes extending far into the night. Minutes of proceedings were kept and submitted, and the various extended arguments indulged in were duly reported to me after the adjournment of each special session. The board representing the insurgent interests could not give any satisfactory explanation of the qualified sovereignty, measure of protection, or specific autonomy which it thought should be vested in or enjoyed by the respective governments, nor present any practical plan for the solution of the vexed political problems which constantly arose in the progress of the discussion. It conceded the fact that the protection of the United States was essential to the integrity and welfare of the Islands, but could not determine how that protection should be applied ; certainly not to the extent of interference with internal affairs further than the collection of customs, possibly, from which source the United States might receive a compensation for the protection furnished. They begged for some tangible concessions from the United States Government — one which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay the excitement. Nothing could be accomplished without the sacrifice of some of the attributes of sovereignty and certainly that could not be done by any existing authority.

“ Finally, the conferences became the object of insurgent suspicion and of amusement to those who did not wish bene-

* Otis Report, page 82.

ficial results. The newspapers announced that a peace commission was about to be sent from the United States, and it was observed that the volunteers were not being sent home as the newspapers announced had been ordered. What was the meaning of this commission when one was in session already and why were the regular regiments being despatched from the United States? The United States authorities were merely endeavoring to gain time to place themselves in position to impose slavery upon the Filipinos."

[NOTE:—On January 25, General Otis wrote Brigadier-General Hughes a letter,* "which he could present if he chose at the next and last conference." This letter explains the mission of the Philippine Commission which was about to be appointed and which was to come "with full instructions from the President of the United States and empowered to act for him." The letter goes on to say:

"On January 16, I telegraphed to Washington as follows: "Conditions improving; confidence of citizens returning; business active. Conference held Saturday; insurgents presented following statement, asking that it be cabled: "Undersigned commissioners commander in chief of revolutionary army of these islands state to commissioners of General Otis that aspiration Filipino people is independence, with restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree with American when latter agree to officially recognize the former." No conclusion reached; another conference tomorrow evening. I understand insurgents wish qualified independence under United States protection.'

"To this despatch no reply has been received."

In closing, General Otis states, "no hostile act will be inaugurated by the United States troops."]

* Otis Report, page 83.

Final Joint Conference.*

"The commissioners held their final joint conference, I think, on January 25, with the insurgent representatives. It was one continued plea for some concession which would satisfy the people. One of them was a man of excellent legal ability, who had occupied an important judicial position at Cebu under the Spanish government for a number of years. He had recently arrived in Manila, and on the invitation of Aguinaldo had visited Malolos. He was animated with a desire to restore harmonious relations, or at least to affect a temporary peace until the existing excitement could be allayed, when the people might listen to reason. He secured the appointment of Aguinaldo's board and was named thereon as the most important member, but he was so circumscribed by specific instructions that he could not accomplish anything. I charged him with playing a false part, basing the charge on a knowledge of his legal requirements. He confessed that he was fully aware of the untenable position he occupied, and was powerless under the circumstances. He was an adept at legal friction and could discover pregnant both negative and positive in every international postulate. The appointment of the President's commission had caused so much speculation, both as to membership and object, that I desired to correct mistaken impressions and to take away further opportunity for deliberate falsehood, and knowing that this gentleman still held friendly relations with the Malolos authorities and desired to know the truth in the matter, I sent him the following unofficial letter :

"MANILA, P. I., *February 3, 1899.*

"HON. FLORENTINE TORRES, *Manila, P. I.*

"MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of a Washington dispatch, dated the first instant, which informs me that the gentlemen who expect to serve on the proposed commission on the part of the United States will reach Hongkong on the

* Otis Report, pages 83-85.

21st of the month. They will probably arrive here about the 25th.

“So many inaccuracies have been spread abroad concerning the identity of the gentlemen of the commission that I desire to make explanation. They are Messrs. Denby, Schurman, and Worcester. Respecting the first, he is doubtless well known as the late United States minister to China; the second is the President of Cornell University, one of the leading institutions of learning of the United States; the third is Professor Worcester, of the University of Michigan, also one of our leading educators and who has a personal acquaintance with the Philippines, he having spent some time here. He is a friend of Dr. Bourns of our health board, who formerly made a tour of the Philippine Islands in the interest of science.

“I am sure the reputation of these gentlemen will commend them to the Filipino people as men of probity, ability, and most humane sentiments, having at heart the interest of that people. Admiral Dewey and myself have also been placed on this commission — the Government following the policy pursued with reference to Cuba and Porto Rico. My own inclinations and desire are not to serve thereon, being simply a soldier, but I must obey the commands of my Government.

“It is quite important that friendly relations be maintained in every way among all of us, and I am doing my utmost to that end. A great deal of friction has been caused by the action of troops, resulting, I am certain, from a misunderstanding of conditions. Our soldiers are frequently insulted and threatened within our own lines, but thus far have quietly submitted, obeying their instructions. If, however, these threatening demonstrations should proceed so far as to endanger life, I might not be able to hold them in check. I trust that the revolutionary authorities will exercise every endeavor to put a stop to demonstrations, similar to those witnessed during the past few days.

“I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

“ E. S. OTIS.”

Further Correspondence between Otis and Aguinaldo.*

“A few days before the above letter was written, and on January 26, I was surprised by the receipt of a letter from Aguinaldo because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness by the arbitrament of war. I cabled it in cipher to Washington in accordance with his request, as it contained such suggestive announcements of the course of conduct he was likely to pursue. The cablegram and my reply to the communication are as follows :

“MANILA, P. I., *January 27, 1899.*

“ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington,*

“The following received :

“PHILIPPINE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

“*Office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs.*

“Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

“*Commander in Chief of the American Forces*

“*of Occupation in Manila :*

“My government has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is to-day enthusiastically proclaimed by the people, because of its conviction that its duty is to interpret faithfully the aspirations of that people — a people making superhuman efforts to revindicate their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers.

“To this end, of the governments to-day recognized and observed among cultured nations, they have adopted the form of government most compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjust their actions to the dictates of reason and of right, in order to demonstrate their aptitude for civil life.

“And, taking the liberty to notify your excellency, I confidently hope, that, doing justice to the Philippine people, you will be pleased to inform the Government of your nation that

* Otis Report, page 84.

the desire of mine, upon being accorded official recognition, is to contribute to the best of its scanty ability to the establishment of a general peace.

"May God keep your excellency many years.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

"(Seal of the Revolutionary Government
of the Philippines.)

"A. MABINI.

"MALOLOS, *January* 23, 1899.

"OTIS.

"HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

"*Manila, P. I., January* 27, 1899.

"Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

"*Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces,*

"*Malolos, P. I.*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I received yesterday a communication dated the 23d instant, signed by you and purporting to be issued from the office of the secretary of foreign affairs of the 'Philippine national government.'

"I am pleased to further inform you that a translation of that communication into the English language, as shown in the accompanying paper, has been cabled in full to the United States authorities at Washington.

"I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"E. S. OTIS,

"*Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*"

Indications of War.*

"During this period rapidly succeeding significant events were fast approaching a state of war and strongly indicated the fixed determination of the insurgent government to drive the United States from Luzon as soon as it could gather its armed men in sufficient numbers. It had appropriated the

* Otis Report, page 87.

railroad, every engine and most of its rolling stock. It was perfecting its intrenchments around us, planting its guns, concentrating its troops, and bringing up its army supplies, though still publicly asserting its desire for peace. With the cunning which it has always attempted to practise in its amateur diplomacy it endeavored to force the United States to commit the first physical act of hostility in the way of musketry fire, in order to appeal to the sympathies of the foreign public for a seemingly oppressed people, which it falsely claimed to represent. In this it signally failed. The knifing and attempted shooting of our picket sentries brought no hostile response, except the killing, by the intended victim, of the assassin who had so dexterously used the knife on him. The excitement within the city was very noticeable, and the cruelty of the 'Americano' was the theme. No one seemed to be possessed of any fixed determination but the Tagalo. All others were watching for new demonstrations and waiting for developments. Manila is unparalleled for diversity of race and babel of tongues; also for its grade of enlightenment from barbaric ignorance to the highest civilized stage. Rumors innumerable and of the most varied character filled the atmosphere. To-day attack was imminent, and to-morrow friendly councils were about to prevail. One fairly well acquainted with the scheming in progress and the trend of events could not reach any satisfactory conclusions on the probabilities of war, and to one unacquainted therewith sane conclusions were impossible. I endeavored to inform Admiral Dewey of the actual situation from day to day, and a few extracts from hastily dictated letters of that time will show how hard it was to formulate opinion. These brief extracts are also an index to swiftly recurring events. The following are furnished:

General Otis's Daily Reports to Admiral Dewey.*

“ MANILA, *P. I.*, *January 16*, 1899.

“ I have been too busy to write, but had there been anything special to communicate should have done so. The city is now very quiet and people are again appearing on the streets, seemingly confident that no immediate disturbances are likely to ensue. . . . †

“ Our conferences with General Aguinaldo's commissioners are still in progress. The commissioners had a long session on Saturday evening and meet again to-morrow evening. The conferences seem to have quieted the atmosphere very much. The Malolos Congress on Saturday, I understand, disposed of some radical questions by vote. Indications are that the United States Government received favorable consideration. I do not look for anything to develop in the next few days, but we are obliged to keep up constant vigilance.

“ *January 19*, 1899.

“ . . . Everything remains quiet in the city. It was rumored this morning that insurgents say we are only trying to prolong our conference until we can receive more troops, and that the commission appointed, or to be appointed, by the President is only another ruse to gain time. Their army seems to be more or less excited and is considering the matter whether it would not be policy to destroy us all at once, before we can get any more soldiers. All this may be called street rumor, but it is very actively circulated. The insurgent army is becoming very tired of doing nothing and demands blood. Business is being transacted as usual: a good many people on the streets and quite a number returning again to town.

* Otis Report, page 88.

† In every case omissions follow report.

“ January 21, 1899.

“I was very sorry when I learned yesterday that you had withdrawn the *Monterey* and *Concord*. I said last night that there was no immediate prospect of trouble. By that expression I meant that there would be no outbreak for a day or two. From my information this morning I am convinced that the insurgents intend to try their hand in a very short time — how soon I cannot tell. They will not now permit us to cross their lines and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that very shortly they would give us battle. My best information is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the least spark may start a conflagration. Your war vessels placed as formerly will not incite them to an attack, but will add to their fears of success in case they begin it. They are no longer amenable to reason: the lower elements have gained control and their congress is powerless to manage them. The best Filipinos in the city say that they are going to attack the city, and that they will do it very soon, entertaining the insane idea that they can drive us out. Should they attack the fight will be over before your vessels can reach the points where they were formerly placed.

“I am sending out to-day for Iloilo a transport with 600 discharged native Spanish soldiers who live in the southern islands, and am trying to get rid of about 1,500 of these native troops whose homes are in Luzon. They are all insurgents now and give us trouble in the city.

“ January 23, 1899.

“ . . . No exciting developments this morning. Another conference was held yesterday between Aguinaldo's and our representatives, resulting in very little. It was adjourned until next Wednesday. Aguinaldo is insisting upon the recognition of independence and the return of the *Abbie* and the launches. I understand that the Malolos Congress passed the proposed constitution with the clause inserted which Mabini insisted on, viz., ‘Placing the power in the hands of Aguinaldo to declare war.’

"The city is very quiet. Yesterday we got rid of 276 of the discharged Spanish native troops, sending them down the bay. We have still remaining 315 of the Macabebes who are afraid to go out of Manila, and about 300 other natives who want to stay here.

"I had a long talk with General Rios yesterday. He says there are 24 officers, with servants, on his vessel, and considerable money, which he would like to have remain here, and 71 passengers, besides the soldiers and crew; that the officers belong to organizations which have been disbanded, and that they came here with their families and property with the intention of going back to Spain by first available transport at their own expense, and he does not want the soldiers or troops to land. I have directed the captain of the port to land the officers and passengers, and to keep the vessel in the harbor . . . Nothing this morning from Washington. The despatch of yesterday directed me to make strenuous efforts to have insurgents release Spanish prisoners whom they hold. I replied that my influence was not great at present, and that I had made such an effort to release the Spanish priests that I was now accused of being in partnership with the archbishop.

"January 24, 1899.

"Things look a little ominous to-day. You have undoubtedly seen in the papers an account of yesterday's affair at Malolos, viz., The proclaiming of the constitution, the proclaiming of Aguinaldo as president, captain-general, and everything else, and the speech delivered by Paterno, in which he announced that they would drive the invader from the soil. Everything points to their determination to attack us, if they can persuade themselves that they can do so successfully, before the regular regiments arrive. This is confirmed in a great many ways, and I am sure it is the policy on which they are at present proceeding. They may succeed in burning a portion of the town, but little less, I imagine.

"January 25, 1899.

"I am in receipt of your letter of this morning. I do not consider that the war is over for the present. The insurgents would attack at once if they could be convinced that their efforts would meet with success. The leading Filipinos of the city are afraid to come near me and are in a very excited condition. They know the danger of an outbreak at any moment, and we are holding all troops well in hand constantly. The business men of all nationalities are intently watching developments. The revolutionary government seems to be in the ascendancy, and our former Filipino friends who favored annexation a short time ago are, for personal safety, giving a sort of adherence to the Malolos Government. All this I fully know, and a great deal more, which I can tell you first opportunity, but which it would not be prudent to write.

"The Cavite Filipinos went out to join the insurgent ranks during the inspection and review of that zone by their secretary of war — at least so I think — and they can quickly go back to the ranks at any time they may be called upon to do so.

"February 3, 1899.

"One of the . . . launches arrived yesterday, cleared from Hongkong; she is one of the three of which . . . wrote, and concerning which I reported that from information received here I was quite certain was about to bring arms. Upon arrival here her cargo tallied with her manifest and she was apparently all right. . . .

"The officer in charge explained that she was about two days late in arriving, owing to bad weather, which compelled her to lie off coast. These two days gave her time to run to the coast and discharge. . . .

"Yesterday afternoon General MacArthur, whose troops north of the Pasig have experienced trouble with the insurgents who have passed over his lines, sent Major Strong, his adjutant-general, out to the officer in command to demand an explanation. Strong on passing our lines, was placed under

a strong insurgent guard and taken to Mandaloyan, a point on the Pasig across the San Juan River. There he found the officer in charge and quite a considerable insurgent force taking from several boxes a quantity of new revolvers and Mauser rifles which had just been received. Spanish prisoners were there (the Spanish prisoners whom the insurgents hold) putting the parts of the rifles together and making them ready for distribution. . . .

“There has been a great deal of friction along the lines the past two days, and we will be unable to tamely submit to the insulting conduct and threatening demonstrations of these insurgents much longer. I am informed, however, that the chief men of the insurgent government desire to avoid any conflict at present; possibly for the reason that they are expecting to receive arms very soon, possibly because they fear they may not be successful at the present time, and possibly because they may have a belief that they can secure what they desire without conflict. They are constantly asking me to make concessions, that they may be able to control their troops. They have seized a number of our men, and some, I think, inside of our lines. Yesterday I sent Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineers Corps, to Malolos, to secure the release of the men; he did not return last evening, but telegraphed me from Malolos that he would explain his delay on his return which he intimated would be to-day.

“The city is quiet, though there is a vast amount of underlying excitement. We are constantly losing our employees. Yesterday seven of our men at Malacanan quarters left us suddenly to join the insurgents, so we are now very short-handed. They stole and took with them whatever they could find of value, one of them driving out of the lines Colonel Barry’s carriage, which we consider lost property.

“Notwithstanding these ominous signs, unremitting exertions were continually being made for a satisfactory solution of affairs. On the 11th of January I sent my adjutant-general,

Colonel Barry, to Malolos, directing him to bear a written message to Aguinaldo, procure a personal interview with him if possible, acquaint him fully with the efforts we were making to preserve the peace, and impress upon him the necessity for more conservative action on the part of his troops. At this time a visit by an officer at the insurgent capital was not considered an agreeable pastime, as he was liable to receive gross insults. Colonel Barry, however, met with little difficulty, presented himself at Aguinaldo's headquarters, and requested of his secretary permission to pay his respects in person, stating that he was the bearer of an important communication concerning which General Otis desired him to confer with the general. Aguinaldo's secretary received the letter, stating that he would present it and make known General Otis's request. Soon after he returned, conveying General Aguinaldo's regrets that press of business did not permit him to accord the personal interview as requested, and the colonel was referred to President Mabini, of the cabinet. Mabini received him graciously, and quite a lengthy interview followed. Mabini assured him, in substance, that the insurgent government had exerted itself to maintain friendly relations with the Americans: had thus far succeeded: that it would continue to make exertion to this end, but that it could not control its people beyond a certain point, as they were greatly excited: that his government would do all in its power to effect an amicable adjustment of pending difficulties. The communication which Colonel Barry presented was the one of January 9, in response to Aguinaldo's letter of that date, in which he announced the appointment of the insurgent commission and which appears on a former page."

Correspondence Just before the Outbreak.*

"NOTE OF EXPLANATION. — During the latter part of January the insurgents along their established lines and

* Senate Document 208, page 66.

within the city exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming a defiant attitude, so much so that our troops were gathered well in hand to meet any demonstration which might be attempted. Insurgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches. To arrest these proceedings, our officers, and citizens of Manila connected with the insurgent government, were sent to insurgent general officers at various places along their lines to request that they keep their men in check, which the latter invariably promised to do, paying, however, little heed to the promises. On February 1, a small detachment belonging to our engineer company was arrested within our territory and sent to Malolos. This act brought on the following correspondence :

“HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

“*Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.*”

“General EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“*Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces, Malolos.*”

“GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of engineers, consisting of a sergeant and four privates, who are engaged in making surveys for the completion of the map of Manila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting, has been missing for two or three days and is reported to be confined in Malolos. The detachment was sent out to do work within the city and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I do not understand, nor can I imagine for what reason they are held at Malolos. I am also informed that a citizen connected with Harper's Weekly, newspaper of New York, engaged in taking views for that paper, has also been arrested and held as prisoner. I know nothing of this except from report, nor do I know who the man is. I am also informed that a private soldier who went beyond the lines without authority, and for what motive I do not know, is also held as prisoner.

“I send my staff officer, Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to make inquiries and request your action in this matter.

" I am doing everything possible to preserve the peace and avoid all friction until the Filipino people can be made fully acquainted with the sentiment, and intentions of the American Government, when I am confident they will appreciate the endeavors of the United States and will again look upon that country as their friend and protector. I also fully believe that the present unrest is the result of the machinations of evil-disposed persons.

" I am, General, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

" E. S. OTIS,

" *Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*

" MALOLOS, *February 4, 1899.*

" Major-General OTIS,

" *Chief of the Forces of Occupation of Manila and Cavite.*

" GENERAL: In reply to your letter of February 2, I have the honor to state that the sergeant and four American soldiers of the Engineer Corps, to-day liberated, were detained within our territory, beyond our advanced lines on Solis Street, examining our intrenchments and defences at a distance of less than 200 meters.

" The said individuals carried a revolver, knives, a compass, plans of Manila and its suburbs, a book with topographical notes, a measuring tape, a machete, two penknives, scales, etc.

" I deeply regret that these soldiers have been taken within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers' witnesses of our detention, inasmuch as there exists a decree, dated October 20, which prohibits all foreigners from approaching our defensive works, taking photographic views of the same, drawing plans, or entering our territory with arms, although free transit is permitted to all who are unarmed.

" The correspondent of Harper's Weekly was arrested in San Juan del Monte taking photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Colonel Miguel he has been sent his camera and his horse.

" I must state that in consideration of the friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the said soldiers have not

been imprisoned, but detained in accordance with the spirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the Gobierno Militar and have been issued the daily rations of our officers. If they have been uncomfortable it is due to the excessive sobriety of our race and soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and sleep on the hard ground.

“With these explanations I believe, General, you will understand the motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberated, and who have been treated with all due consideration.

“I therefore hope that your determination may be another motive on which to base our friendly relations with the great American Republic, and in consideration of this I also decree the liberty of the correspondent referred to.

“I am, General, as ever, your obedient servant,

“EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

Unamended Cablegram of the President of the United States.

“EXECUTIVE MANSION,

“*Washington, December 21, 1898.*

“TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

“SIR: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

“With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In the fulfilment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

“In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public

manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who either by active aid, or by honest submission, co-operate with the government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness, if need be, but without severity, so far as may be possible.

“ Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as far as may be practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands.

“ While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable, receipts are to be given. All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will

be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

“Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

“WILLIAM MCKINLEY.”

APPENDIX B.

Proclamations Issued by Aguinaldo, January 5, 1899.*

“The government of the Philippines has considered it its duty to set forth to the civilized powers the facts determining the rupture of its amicable relations with the army of the United States of America in these islands, to the end that they may thereby reach the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything possible to avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.

“After the naval combat, which occurred on May 1 of last year, between the Spanish squadron and that of America, the commander of the latter consented to return from Hong-kong to this beloved soil, and he distributed among the

* Otis Report, 1899, pages 76-79.

Filipinos some rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of re-establishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention at Biac-na-Bato, in order to have the Filipinos on his side.

“The people, influenced by the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, understood the necessity of fighting for their liberty, feeling sure that Spain would be destroyed and rendered incapable of leading them along the road to prosperity and progress. The Filipinos hailed my advent with joy, and I had the honor of being proclaimed leader on account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolution.

“Then all the Filipinos without distinction of classes took arms, and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of Mindanao.

“Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of our arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships; and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, which posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples; we felt ourselves under the safe-guard of a free people.

“The Americans seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Paranaque, and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops, as far as Maytubig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my people, by the employment of astuteness, not

unaccompanied by violence. They forced a capitulation of the garrison at Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified, my forces reaching as far as the suburbs of Malate, Ermita, Paco, Sampaloe, and Tondo.

“Notwithstanding these services, and although the Spaniards would not have surrendered but for the fact that my troops had closed every avenue of escape to the towns of the interior, the American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

“I represented to the American generals the injustice done me, and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my co-operation, but they utterly declined to do so. Nevertheless, being always desirous of showing friendliness and good feeling towards those who called themselves liberators of the Philippine people, I ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Ermita, Malate, Sampaloe, and Tondo, retaining only a portion of the suburb of Paco.

“In spite of these concessions, not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent. Almost at the same time I received a letter from General Otis, command of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond the lines marked on a map which he also sent me, and which showed within the lines the town of Pandacan, and the hamlet of Singalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area of Manila and its suburbs.

“In view of this unjustifiable attitude of both American leaders, I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I named commissioners, who placed themselves in communication with these Americans. Although Admiral

Dewey received in an insolent manner and with aggressive phrases my commissioners, whom he did not permit to speak, I yielded to the friendly suggestions of General Otis, withdrawing my forces to the desired line for the purpose of avoiding contact with his troops. This gave rise to many misunderstandings, but I hoped that once the Paris conference was at an end my people would obtain the independence promised them by the consul-general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly assured and proclaimed in manifestoes and speeches would be established by the American generals who have reached these shores.

“ But it did not turn out thus. The said general accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is that with rising ambition, they ordered forces from Iloilo, on December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government.

“ Such procedures, so foreign to the dictates of culture and the usages observed by civilized nations, gave me the right to act without observing the usual rules of intercourse. Nevertheless, in order to be correct to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners, charged to solicit him to desist from his rash enterprise, but they were not listened to.

“ My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

“ Upon their heads be all the blood that may be shed.

“ EMILIO AGUINALDO.

“ MALOLOS, *January 5, 1899.*

“A number of copies of this unfortunate declaration were speedily sent out for circulation among the people, when an effort was made to recall them and substitute an amended edition, but a few had found their way to Manila and were eagerly sought after by the citizens. That evening the insurgent newspaper entitled ‘The Herald of the Revolution,’ published a supplement in which the following appeared:

“OFFICIAL MANIFESTO OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

“To my brothers the Filipinos, and to all the respectable consuls and other foreigners:

“A proclamation of Mr. E. S. Otis, Major-General of the United States Volunteers, appeared in the Manila papers yesterday, compelled me to issue the present, with a view to expose to all who read and understand the present document my most solemn protest against the whole contents of the said proclamation, the duties of my conscience toward my God, my political compromises toward my beloved people, and my private and official relationship with the United States nation, all of which forced me to do so.

“The General Otis called himself in the said proclamation military governor of the Philippine Islands. I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy of my soul, against such authority.

“I solemnly declare that neither at Singapore, Hongkong, nor here in the Philippines did I ever agree, by word or in writing, to recognize the sovereignty of America in this our lovely country. On the contrary, I declare that I returned to these islands, transported by the United States man-of-war, on the 19th of May last, with the decided and firm intention to fight the Spaniards in order to reconquer our liberty and independence. I have thus declared in my official proclamation dated May 24, and I have likewise published in a manifesto, addressed to the Filipino people on the 12th of June last, when in my native village of Kawil, I exhibited for the first time our holy national flag as a sacred emblem of that sublime

aspiration, and finally, so it was confirmed by the American General, Mr. Merritt, antecessor of Mr. E. S. Otis, in the manifest that he addressed to the Filipino people days before he *intimated* the Spanish general, Mr. Jaudenes, the surrender of the city of Manila, in which manifest he clearly and positively said that the army and navy of the United States came here to give us our liberty and destroy the bad rule of the Spanish Government. To say all at a time, nationals and foreigners are witnesses that the army and navy of the United States stationed here have acknowledged the fact of the belligerency of the Filipinos, whose flag has triumphantly crossed our sea before the eyes of the foreign nations here represented by the respective consuls.

“As in General Otis’s proclamation, he alluded to some instructions edited by His Excellency, the President of the United States, referring to the administration of the matters in the Philippine Islands, I, in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice, and that of all the right which has been visibly granted to me to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regeneration, protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government on the sovereignty of these islands.

“I equally protest, in the name of the Filipino people, against the said intrusion because as they have granted their vote of confidence appointing me president of the nation, although I don’t consider that I deserve such, therefore I consider it my duty to defend to death its liberty and independence.

“Finally, I protest against such an unexpected act of sovereignty of the United States in these islands, in the name of all the proceedings which I have in my possession with regard to my relationship with the United States authorities, which unmistakably prove that the United States did not take me from Hongkong to fight the Spaniards for their benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty and independence, for which purpose the said authorities verbally promised me their most decided assistance and efficacious co-operation ;

and so should you all, my dear brothers, understand, in order that we may united act according to the idea of our liberty and independence, which were our most noble desires, and assist with your work to obtain our aim with the strength which our old conviction may afford and must not go back in the way of glory which we have obtained."

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Persons joining this Society as members are expected:

1. To inform themselves, as fully and as accurately as possible, as to the true state of affairs in the Philippine Islands.
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